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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jason Rowland appeals from the district court's order that denied his motion 
to suppress evidence. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The district court summarized the facts and procedures underlying Rowland's 
conviction for felony possession of methamphetamine as follows (with bracketed 
references to the suppression hearing transcript and exhibits): 
A search warrant was executed at the Defendant's residence on 
November 2, 2013 in the evening. [2/27/14 Tr., p.6, L.18 - p.7, L.2i1 
Officer Teresa Thiemann and Officer Justin Bekker testified at the 
motion to suppress hearing. They participated in executing the search 
warrant. [Tr., p.6, L.18; p.6- p.7, L.2; p.20, Ls.19-24.] 
Officer Thiemann was the first officer to make contact with the 
Defendant upon arriving at the residence. [Tr., p.7, L.22 - p.8, L.2.] 
She was also the officer who signed an affidavit in support of the 
application for the search warrant. [11/4/13 Affidavit of Teresa 
Thiemann.2] The search warrant commanded the search of 529 
California Street as well as of persons for various property, including a 
chainsaw, drug paraphernalia, Methamphetamine, and Marijuana. 
[11/4/13 Search Warrant, a copy of which is attached as Appendix A.] 
Upon arrival, Thiemann went downstairs and found the 
Defendant in a bedroom. [Tr., p.7, L.21 - p.8, L.19; p.14, Ls.7-11.] 
She handcuffed him, escorted him up the stairs, and handed him off to 
another officer outside the door. [Tr., p.8, L.20 - p.9, L.16.] Officer 
Bekker conducted the search prior to the Defendant's arrest. [Tr., 
p.21, L.7 - p.22, L.6; p.28, L.13 - p.29, L.5.] Officer Bekker testified 
that he was unsure whether the Defendant was merely being detained 
In the interest of brevity, all subsequent citations to the February 27, 2014 
suppression motion hearing will be to "Tr." 
2 On February 20, 2015, this Court granted Rowland's motion to augment the record 
to include the Affidavit of Teresa Thiemann and the Search Warrant, file-stamped 
November 4, 2013. (2/20/15 Order Granting Motion to Augment the Record.) 
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or had actually been arrested. [Tr., p.28, Ls.17-20.] A baggie with a 
white powdery substance was found in the Defendant's pocket. [Tr., 
p.22, Ls.2-6.] 
The Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress and Motion to 
Dismiss on February 6, 2014. [R., pp.108-112.] 
Teresa Thiemann testified at the motion to suppress hearing on 
February 27, 2014 regarding the events that occurred on November 2, 
2013. [Tr., p.6, Ls.2-24.] Thiemann is a patrol officer with the City of 
Gooding, and she has been employed by the Gooding City Police 
Department for 9 years. [Id.] On November 2, 2013, Thiemann issued 
and executed a search warrant at the Defendant's residence. [Tr., p.6, 
L.18 - p.7, L.2.] She knew it was the Defendant's residence because 
she has known the Defendant for 9 to 10 years, and he has always 
lived at the residence. [Tr., p.11, Ls.9-19.] Moreover, she had contact 
with the Defendant at the residence approximately 2 to 3 weeks prior. 
[Tr., p.11, Ls.20-23.] The execution of the warrant occurred in the 
evening while it was dark outside. [Tr., p.11, L.24 - p.12, L.3.] 
Upon arrival, some officers went to the front of the house, and 
some officers went to the rear of the house. [Tr., p.7, Ls.7-9.] 
Thiemann secured a door on the side of the house. [Tr., p.7, Ls.9-11.] 
She heard footsteps inside the house, and then she entered the house. 
[Tr., p.7, Ls.16-22.] The door opened up into a stairwell with stairs 
going up and stairs going down. [Tr., p.12, Ls.15-18.] There was one 
room at the bottom of the stairs, and this room was below ground. [Tr., 
p.12, Ls.19-25.] The stairs going up led to the main floor. [Tr., p.12, 
Ls.1-2.] 
Thiemann went downstairs, and it took her approximately 30 
seconds to arrive at the bottom of the stairs. [Tr., p.13, Ls.3-7.] It was 
dark, but she used a flashlight. [Tr., p.14, Ls.4-6.] The stairs were 
covered with various items including clothing, stereos, wiring, tools, 
and other things. [Tr., p.13, Ls.8-20.] A computer tower was at the top 
of the steps. [Tr., p.8, Ls.5-1 O.] Thiemann had to step on things as 
she walked downstairs, and it was noisy. [Tr., p.13, Ls.21-25.] There 
were also items piled at the bottom of the stairs. [Tr., p.14, Ls.1-3.] 




















items listed in the search warrant.f31 [Tr., p.8, Ls.6-16.] As she walked 
down the stairs, she yelled "search warrant." [Tr., p.14, Ls.16-22.] 
Thiemann entered the bedroom at the bottom of the stairs and 
made contact with the Defendant. [Tr., p.7, L.24 - p.8, L.2.] Upon 
making contact with the Defendant, she asked him to place his hands 
in the air. [Tr., p.8, Ls.20-24.] He complied, and then she asked him 
to place his hands behind his back. [Tr., p.8, L.22 - p.9, L.1.] After 
she handcuffed him, she escorted him back upstairs and handed him 
off to a deputy. [Tr., p.9, Ls.10-16.] She told the deputy that the 
Defendant had not yet been patted down or checked for weapons. 
[Tr., p.9, Ls.20-22.] She testified that she told the deputy to conduct a 
patdown of the Defendant. [Tr., p.16, Ls.11-18.] She did not actually 
see the deputy's face, but she saw his arm and observed that he was 
in police uniform. [Tr., p.9, Ls.12-18; p.16, Ls.3-6.] The landing had 
items in it on the floor, so there was only enough room for one person 
to go through the door. [Tr., p.15, L.23 - p.16, L.2.] 
Thiemann testified that the Defendant was not under arrest at 
this point, as they were just securing everyone in the residence. [Tr., 
p.16, L.25 - p.17, L.4.] She testified that she knew that they were 
go'ing to arrest the Defendant; however, he was not under arrest at that 
point. [Tr., p.17, Ls.2-4.] She knew he was going to be arrested 
because she stepped over the chainsaw that was described as stolen 
property in the search warrant. [Tr., p.17, L.21 - p.18, L.2.] He was 
only being detained at that point. [Tr., p.17, Ls.2-4.] 
She then made contact with her supervisor and continued 
searching the residence. [Tr., p.10, Ls.1-4.] During the search, she 
found drug paraphernalia, a white powdery substance, and a green 
leafy substance in an upstairs room. [Tr., p.10, Ls.5-9.] 
Thiemann transported the Defendant to jail and told him he was 
under arrest for possession of paraphernalia, possession of a white 
powdery substance, and possession of stolen property. [Tr., p.10, 
Ls.14-25.] 
3 Officer Thiemann testified that as officers continued to search Rowland's 
residence, presumably after Officer Bekker found a clear bag of methamphetamine 
in Rowland's front left pocket, they matched the serial number of the chainsaw on 
the stairs with the serial number of the stolen chainsaw. (Tr., p.8, Ls.6-16; p.10, 



















Justin Bekker testified at the motion to suppress hearing on 
February 27, 2014 regarding the events that occurred on November 2, 
2013. [Tr., p.20, Ls.13-21.] Bekker is a reserve police officer with the 
Gooding County Police Department. [Tr., p.20, Ls.17-18.] Bekker 
assisted with the search of the Defendant's residence, and he testified 
that they found drug paraphernalia and stolen items. [Tr., p.21, Ls.7-
15.] 
Bekker was the third person to enter the house. [Tr., p.21, Ls.7-
10; p.23, Ls.12-23.] He entered through the front door. [Id.] He saw 
two men, and he told them to lie down on the ground. [Tr., p.25, Ls.15-
21.] He handcuffed the men and searched them. [Tr., p.25, Ls.21-22.] 
He conducted what he referred to as a Terry search which involved 
taking everything out of the pockets to be sure there was nothing that 
could hurt him. [Tr., p.25, L.23 - p.26, L.14; p.27, Ls.8-11.] 
After the inside of the house was secured, Bekker went outside. 
[Tr., p.27, L.20 - p.28, L.1.] Another officer asked Bekker if he would 
pat down the Defendant or search him to make sure he did not have 
any weapons. [Tr., p.28, Ls.4-7.] Bekker was not present outside 
when Thiemann handed the Defendant over to another officer. [Tr., 
p.28, Ls.8-1 0.] Bekker testified that he was unsure if the Defendant 
had been detained or had been arrested, so he conducted what he 
referred to as a Terry search. [Tr., p.28, Ls.17-23.] Bekker interacted 
with the Defendant for approximately 15 to 20 minutes. [Tr., p.21, 
Ls.16-18.] Bekker felt the Defendant's belt and did not feel anything 
metal. [Tr., p.29, Ls.1-21.] Bekker searched the Defendant and found 
money in his left front pocket, and he found a clear bag with a white 
powdery substance inside it. [Tr., p.21, L.25 - p.22, L.6.] 
(R., pp.125-128, pp.2-5 of District Court's Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress and Motion to Dismiss, attached as Appendix B.) 
The state charged Rowland with possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine) and possession of drug paraphernalia, with a persistent violator 
enhancement. (R., pp.45-50.) Rowland moved to suppress the evidence seized as 
a result of the search of his person, conducted during the execution of a search 
warrant at his residence. (R., pp.108-112.) Following a hearing on Rowland's 





















justified as a search incident to lawful arrest, and denied the motion. (R., pp.124-
134.) Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, Rowland pied guilty to possession 
of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), and the state did not pursue the 
paraphernalia or persistent violator charges. (R., pp.145-151.) The district court 
sentenced Rowland to seven years with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction 





















Rowland states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Rowland's motion to 
suppress? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Rowland failed to show error in the district court's order denying 























Rowland Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Order Denying Rowland's 
Motion To Suppress Evidence 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied Rowland's motion to suppress, ruling that the search 
of his person was permitted (1) by the terms of the search warrant, and (2) as a 
search incident to lawful arrest. (R., pp.124-134.) 
Rowland challenges the district court's decision, first arguing that the search 
of his person was not within the scope of the warrant to search "the above described 
premises and persons." (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-14.) Next, Rowland contends the 
officers did not have probable cause to arrest him by seeing the chain saw (and 
case) in the residence, without first comparing the serial number of the chainsaw 
with the stolen chainsaw's serial number. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-20.) 
Rowland's arguments fail. The terms of the search warrant authorize the 
search of persons described in the warrant, and Rowland is clearly described in the 
warrant. Next, when Officer Thiemann entered Rowland's residence and walked 
down the stairs, she instantly recognized the chainsaw as stolen property, giving her 
probable cause to arrest Rowland of possessing such property. Finally, as Rowland 
acknowledges on appeal, under the inevitable discovery exception to the 
exclusionary rule, "even had Officer Bekker not (impermissibly) searched Re. 
Rowland when he did, Mr. Rowland would eventually have been arrested for 






















B. Standard Of Review 
When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court 
accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, 
but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. 
Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). 
C. Because The Search Warrant Authorized A Search Of Rowland, He Is Not 
Entitled To Suppression Of The Evidence Found As A Result Of The Search 
Rowland contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, 
claiming "the search warrant was for a residence only and did not allow for any 
persons to be searched [and] [i]t is not possible to reconcile the search warrant with 
the district court's finding of fact because there were no persons identified by the 
search warrant." (Appellant's Brief, p.9 (emphasis original); see also id., p.11 ('The 
search warrant in this case did not authorize the search of Mr. Rowland, and in fact 
the search warrant did not authorize the search of any persons - the warrant was 
only for the search of a residenc~.").) 
Rowland further states, "[t]he actual search warrant is contained in the first 
three paragraphs, and describes the premises to be searched, and the property to 
be searched for." (Appellant's Brief, p.11; see 11/4/13 Search Warrant, pp.1-2.) 
Rowland excuses, as mere boilerplate language, the search warrant's seminal 
command that officers "search the above described premises and persons[,]" 
claiming such language "is a reference to the premises." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) 
Rowland does not explain how a "commonsense reading" (see id.) of the phrase 





















his trimmed-down view of the "actual" search warrant, Rowland asserts there were 
"no 'persons' specifically identified and described in the warrant as those to be 
searched pursuant to the warrant." (Id.) 
Search warrants are "not subject to technical drafting requirements and 
should be interpreted in a commonsense and realistic fashion." State v. Young, 136 
Idaho 711, 715, 39 P.3d 651, 655 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 
382, 388, 707 P.2d 493, 499 (Ct. App. 1985)); see also United States v. Johnson, 
541 F.2d 1311, 1313 (8th Cir. 1976) (noting the standard to be used in determining 
the adequacy of descriptions contained in a search warrant "is one of practical 
accuracy rather than technical nicety"). When evaluating the validity of a warrant, 
the court may consider "the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the warrant, 
the contents of the search warrant, and the circumstances of the search." United 
States v. Robinson, 358 F.Supp.2d 975 (D. Mont. 2005). Application of the 
foregoing legal principles to the facts of this case demonstrates that the search 
warrant issued in this case authorized a search of Rowland's person. 
Rowland's contention that "[t]he actual search warrant is contained in the first 
three paragraphs" is not well-taken. In essence, Rowland is incongruously saying 
that only the first three paragraphs of the search warrant is the search warrant. Not 
only does Rowland ignore the fact that the entire four-page document is entitled 
"SEARCH WARRANT" (see 11 /4/13 Search Warrant, Appendix A), he has failed to 
provide any legal authority to support his assertion that a search warrant cannot 
include statements by an affiant within the body of a search warrant. (See 




















appeal, and this Court should decline to consider it. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 257, 
263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (declining to address argument as a result based on 
established principle that "[a] party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or 
argument is lacking"). Contrary to Rowland's argument, the district court correctly 
concluded that the search warrant authorized the search of Rowland: 
The search warrant specifically mentions the Defendant. Officer 
Thiemann, in her sworn affidavit, stated that Jeremy Larson informed 
her that he took the stolen chainsaw to the Defendant's house. Larson 
told Thiemann that the Defendant offered to pay him $150.00 if he took 
the chainsaw to 529 California Street in Gooding, Idaho. The 
chainsaw was described in the warrant as a Stihl chainsaw that was 
orange and white in color with an orange case. The serial number was 
also included in the search warrant. · 
The search warrant authorized a search of 529 California Street 
as well as a search of the Defendant's person for the items described 
in the warrant which included the chainsaw, Methamphetamine, 
Marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. 
(R., p.131.) 
The district court was correct. The search warrant, which included averments 
from Officer Thiemann's supporting affidavit, commanded officers "to search the 
described premises and persons for the property described" and to seize such 
property if found - including, inter alia, marijuana, methamphetamine, drug 
trafficking paraphernalia, and a stolen orange and white Stihl chain saw in an orange 
case (serial number 282877540). (11 /4/13 Search Warrant, pp.1-4.) The search 
warrant, signed by a judge on November 2, 2013, stated: (1) Rowland was an 
occupant of the house to be searched, 529 California Street in Gooding; (2) Officer 
Thiemann had information about a chainsaw that had been stolen - it was "made by 





















and that it was in an orange case[;]" (3) a man recently arrested by Officer 
Thiemann, Jason Larson, admitted he had stolen the chain saw and delivered it to 
Rowland's residence after Rowland "told him that if he brought it to him he would 
give him $150.00[;]" (4) Larson said he had last seen the chainsaw at Rowland's 
residence on October 31, 2013 (two days prior to the search warrant's signing and 
execution); (5) Larson knew there were drugs in Rowland's house because 
"Rowland had weighed Meth on a silver scale Halloween night[,]" and the scale 
showed the substance weighed "6.2", although Larson was unsure if it was ounces 
or grams; and (6) Larson also told Officer Thiemann "that he had seen Marijuana in 
the home during that same time as well." (Id., pp.1-3.) 
Contrary to Rowland's argument, he was repeatedly identified in the search 
warrant, not only by name and with his place of residence, but with his criminal 
activity that related directly to the items sought to be found in the search warrant -
especially methamphetamine and the Stihl chain saw. Contrary to Rowland's 
argument, the search warrant's command to search "the above described "persons" 
could only have been in reference to Rowland, as Larson was obviously an 
"informant" who had been arrested, and Rowland was the only other non-law 
enforcement officer mentioned in the warrant. Rowland has failed to meet his 
burden of showing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress 



















D. Correct Application Of The Law To The Facts Shows Law Enforcement Had 
Probable Cause To Arrest Rowland For Felony Possession Of Stolen 
Property 
"Warrantless arrests made upon probable cause do not violate the Fourth 
Amendment." State v. Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, 349, 194 P.3d 550, 553 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008)). "Probable cause for an 
arrest is not measured by the same level of proof required for conviction." 
Chapman, 146 Idaho at 351, 194 P.3d at 555 (citation omitted). Rather, probable 
cause only "requires that the police possess information that would lead a person of 
ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion 
that a crime has been committed by the arrestee." State v. Finnicum, 147 Idaho 
137, 140, 206 P.3d 501, 504 (Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted). The probable 
cause determination "depends upon the totality of the circumstances and the 
assessment of probabilities in the particular factual context." Finnicum, 147 Idaho at 
140, 206 P.3d at 504 (citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003)). The 
facts upon which the probable cause finding is based are evaluated objectively and 
must take into account the officers' expertise and experience. Finnicum, 147 Idaho 
at 140, 206 P.3d at 504 (citing State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136-37, 922 P.2d 
1059, 1062-63 (1996)); Chapman, 146 Idaho at 351, 194 P.3d at 555 (citing State v. 
Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319, 323, 824 P.2d 894, 898 (Ct. App. 1991)). 
Rowland has failed to meet his burden of showing the district court erred 
denying his motion to suppress. As correctly summarized by the district court below, 
the evidence presented in relation to Rowland's suppression motion established 





















enforcement officers had probable cause to arrest Rowland for felony possession of 
stolen property. (See Statement of Facts, supra (with citations to the record).) 
Rowland challenges the district court's finding of probable cause, arguing that the 
officers did not have probable cause to arrest him for a crime until after Officer 
Bekker searched him. (Appellant's Brief pp.18-19.) Rowland argues: 
The district court held that the presence of a chainsaw in the 
house was sufficient probable cause to arrest Mr. Rowland for 
possession of stolen property; however, such was error. A chainsaw is 
a relatively common tool that may be found in a residence and is not 
so unique an item as to instantly be recognizable as contraband. 
Many homes have chainsaws, and the presence of chainsaw parts, 
where the warrant identified a Stihl brand chainsaw, does not, in and of 
itself, constitute probable cause to believe this was the chainsaw the 
thief described, particularly where Officer Thiemann testified that she 
had not yet verified the serial number on the chainsaw parts match that 
of the stolen chainsaw. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.19.) 
Rather than repeat the well-reasoned arguments set forth in the district court's 
Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's Motion to Suppress and Motion to Dismiss 
(R., pp.124-134), the state hereby adopts the district's court's memorandum decision 
and incorporates them by reference herein. For this Court's convenience, a copy of 
the district court's Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's Motion to Suppress and 
Motion to Dismiss, is attached to this brief as Appendix B. The state further supports 
the district court's analysis with the following comments. 
"In ascertaining whether probable cause exists, a magistrate is justified in 
drawing reasonable inferences from the facts stated in support of the issuance of the 
search warrant." State v. Sorbel, 124 Idaho 275, 278, 858 P.2d 814, 817 (Ct. App. 





















Although Rowland states that "[a] chainsaw is a relatively common tool that may be 
found in a residence" (Appellant's Brief, p.19), a reasonable inference from Officer 
Thiemann's testimony is that she instantly recognized more detail of the chainsaw 
than suggested. 
At the suppression motion hearing, Officer Thiemann was asked why, during 
the search, she believed Rowland was going to be arrested. (Tr., p.17, Ls.21-22.) 
She answered, "Due to the fact that I had already stepped over the chain saw that 
had been described to us as the property that we were looking for." (Tr., p.17, L.25 
- p.18, L.2 (emphasis added).) It is reasonable to infer that Officer Thiemann 
observed that the chainsaw she stepped over on the stairs fit the description given 
for the stolen chainsaw in the search warrant -- including its colors (orange and 
white) and brand name ("Stihl"). (See 11/4/13 Search Warrant, pp.1-2; see also Tr., 
p.18, Ls.6-8 (when asked what kind of chainsaw she was talking about, Officer 
Thiemann said, "We're talking about a steel [sic] chain saw").) 
Considering the reasonable inference that the description of the stolen 
chainsaw (sans its serial number) that officers had probable cause to believe was in 
the house matched the chainsaw seen by Officer Thiemann on the stairs both in 
brand and color, the district court properly concluded that the search of Rowland 





















E. Even If The Search Of Rowland Was Not Proper Pursuant To The Warrant Or 
The Probable Cause Exception, The Evidence In Rowland's Pocket Would 
Have Inevitably Been Discovered 
Assuming that the search of Rowland's pocket was not properly included as 
part of the premises or did not fall within the probable cause exception, exclusion of 
the evidence discovered therein would be improper under the inevitable discovery 
doctrine. See State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 101-102, 57 P.3d 807, 812-813 
(Ct. App. 2002) (inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary 
rule). The state sought application of the inevitable discovery doctrine in the event 
the district court found the search otherwise improper. (R., p.130 (see Appendix A); 
Tr., p34, L.19 - p.35, L.9.) Even though the district court did not base its decision on 
this ground, this Court may affirm the result on that theory. McKinney v. State, 133 
Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999); State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704, 931 
P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997). 
Where the prosecution establishes by a preponderance of proof that the 
evidence at issue inevitably would have been found by lawful means, then exclusion 
of the evidence is improper even if it was actually obtained by constitutionally 
improper means. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984); Stuart v. State, 136 
Idaho 490, 497-98, 36 P.3d 1278, 1285-86 (2001). The underlying rationale of this 
rule is that suppression should leave the prosecution in the same position it would 
have been absent the police misconduct, not a worse one. Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-44; 
Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho at 102, 57 P.3d at 813. 
While still conducting a search of Rowland's residence, officers were able to 
match the serial number of the chainsaw that was located on the stairs with the 
15 
serial number of the chainsaw reported stolen. (Tr., p.8, Ls.6-16; p.10, Ls.1-13; 
p.21, L.25 - p.22, L.6.) At that point, law enforcement officers undoubtedly would 
have had probable cause to arrest Rowland for possession of the stolen chainsaw, 
and, under the inevitable discovery doctrine, the clear bag of methamphetamine 
found in Rowland's pocket would not have been subject to exclusion. Based on the 
inevitable discovery doctrine, the district court correctly denied Rowland's motion to 
suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search of his person. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
denying Rowland's motion to suppress evidence. 
DATED this th day of May, 2015. 
16 
C. McKINNEY 
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IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF TI-IEf] . . " 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF Got9tMJ/&-4 M1, ': €it 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH 
WARRANT. 








t 3- tr -- ( 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, TO ANY SHERIFF, CONSTABLE, MARSHAL OR 
POLICEMAN IN THE COUNTY OF GOODING 
1. The following location/s: A dwelling located at 529 California Street in the City of 
Gooding, County of Gooding and State of Idaho, the dwelling is tan in color with brow;1 
trim with the front door located on the face of the house facing East. 
2. For the following property: Marijuana, Meth, drug trafficking paraphernalia along with ar.y 
implements, and paraphernalia used in the sale, and use of Marijuana or Meth, including:, but 
not limited to scales, zip lock baggies, paper bindles, photograpts, sifters, ledger books or 
other sheets memorializing the sale of any controlled substances, all apparent 
instrumentalities or items evidencing the same, packaging materials, records, utility recelpt~, 
envelopes, letters, keys and other indicia of control, ownership, to-wit A dwelling located at 
529 California street in the City of Gooding, County of Gooding and State of Idaho, the 
dwelling is,,~ in color with brown trim with the front door located on the face of the 
·, .. 
residence facing East. The numbers 529 California located on the n9rth side of the front 
door. 
3. Jeremy Todd Larson told me that he had stolen a chain saw and that he dropped it off with 



















the chain saw made by Stihl and that the serial number is 282877540 and that it is orangt;: 
and white in color and that it was in an orange case. 
That the affiant' s belief is based upon the following facts and drcumstances: 
1. Today I did an interview with Jeremy Todd Larson that committed an unlawful entry Upon 
searching him prior to placing him in my patrol car for transport I did a pat down. I found a 
brown glass bottle that had white crystal like residue in it, through my training and 
experience I believe the residue to be methamphetamine. The residue was later tested using 
a NIK (Narcotics Identification Kit) with the residue testing presumptively positive for 
Methamphetamine. There was also a glass pipe with residue in it located in his right front 
pocket, through my training and experience I know this to be i:, smoking device used to 
smoke methamphetamine. He was also a suspect on a theft that had occurred in the pr.st. 
While I was interviewing Jeremy Larson he told me that he had stolen the item in que:,tion 
and that he placed it at 529 California Street located in the city of Gooding, County of 
Gooding, State ofidaho. 
- 2. During the past nine years I have worked for the Gooding City Police Department as 1he 
CSO, and for the past three years as a Patrol Officer I hold a Basic Certificate through Idaho 
state POST. 
3. Based upon my own observations and the observations of other law enforcement offici!r 
involved in the subject investigation, this affidavit is made in support of an application. fo: a 
search warrant. 
4. On 11/02/2013 I Officer Thiemann with the Gooding City Police Department was 





















5. Upon my arrival I could see Jeremy Larson know to me from orevious contacts. I 
transported him to the Gooding County Jail. Before booking him into the jail I read him his 
Miranda and asked him if he wanted to speak with me. He did, after speaking with him he 
told me that he had taken the saw from 1306 ih Ave West in be county of Gooding. 
Jeremy Larson told me that he had transported it to the residence located at 529 California 
street in the city of Gooding. 
6. I asked him why he had taken it there. He informed me that Ja.son Rowland the occupant of 
the house told him that ifhe brought it to him he would give him $150.00. 
7. I asked Jeremy when the last time he saw the chain saw in Jason house was. He told me that 
he was over there on Halloween (10/31/2013) and he saw it then. I then asked ifhe had 
anything else that was in the house that I needed to know about and he told me that thE:re 
was drugs in the house. 
8. I asked Jeremy how he knew that there were drugs in the house. Jeremy told me that Jason 
Rowland had weighed Meth on a silver scale Halloween night. I asked how much he had 
seen him weigh he said the scale said 6.2 he was unsure if it was ounces or grams. Jer,~my 
also told me that he had seen Marijuana in the house during that same time as well 
9. From the statements of Jeremy Larson about marijuana and meth being in the residenc·! 
along with the stolen property Officer Thiemann your affiant believes there is probabk 














YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to search the above described premises and 
persons for the property described above, TO SEIZE it if found and.to bring it promptly before the 
court above named. 
A copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken shall be given to the person from 
whom or from premises property is taken. Ifno person is found in possession, a copy and receipt 
shall be conspicuously posted at the place where the property is found or taken. 
Return of this warrant is to be made to the above entitled cour1 within ten (10) days from the 
date thereof. 
I' 
THIS WARRANT IS AUTHORIZED FOR NIGHTTIME SERVICE. f- Yes No I 
- S};:frpv ,' G r~, t f 
(WARRANT ISSUED AT ) _' -5 \ °'-M.) k),· l I /,,,t, 5 .J J - cJ~ rv-r . 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this 2_ day of -tiJ, v_,,, 1}__. 
v---
I 





































IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 










) ______________ ) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
On February 27, 2013, the Defendant's Motion to Suppre:,s ,~ame on regularly for 
hearing. The State was represented by Trevor Misseldine, Gooding County Deputy Prosecutor, 
and the Defendant was present and represented by Counsel, Stacey Depew. The Court, having 
considered the testimony, exhibits, briefs, and arguments of counsd, took the matter under 
advisement for a written decision. 


















FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL RISTO.RY 
A search warrant was executed at the Defendant's residence on November 2, 2013 in the 
evening. Officer Teresa Thiemann and Officer Justin Bekker testified at the motion to supp1-es~, 
hearing. They participated in executing the search warrant. 
Officer Thiemann was the first officer to make contact with the Defendant upon arriYing 
at the residence. She was also the officer who signed an affidavit in support of the application for 
the search warrant. The search warrant commanded the search of 529 California Street as well ai; 
of persons for various property, including a chainsaw, drug paraphernalia, Methamphetamine, 
and Marijuana. 
Upon arrival, Thiemann went downstairs and found the Defendant in a bedroom. She 
handcuffed him, escorted him up the stairs, and handed. him off to another officer outside the 
door. Officer Bekker conducted the search prior to the Defendant's arrest. Officer Bekke~ 
testified that he was unsure whether the Defendant was merely being detained or had actuall~, 
been arrested. A baggie with a white powdery substance was found in the Defendant's pocket. 
The Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress and Motion to Dismiss on February 6, 2014. 
II. 
JUDICIAL NOTICE 
At the request of the parties, the Court hereby takes judicial notice, pursuant to I.R.E. 
201, of the Search Warrant filed November 4, 2013 and the Preliminary Hearing transcript from 
November 21, 2013. 
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TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS 
A. TESTIMONY 
1. Teresa Thiemann 
Teresa Thiemann testified at the motion to suppress hearing on February 27, 2014 
regarding the events that occurred on November 2, 2013. Thiemann is a patrol officer with th1! 
City of Gooding, and she has been employed by the Gooding City Police Department for 9 years. 
On November 2, 2013, Thiemann issued and executed a search war.ant at the Defendant':; 
residence. She knew it was the Defendant's residence because she has known the Defendant for 
9 to 10 years, and he has always lived at the residence. Moreover, she had contact with th,: 
Defendant at the residence approximately 2 to 3 weeks prior. The execution of the warranr 
occurred in the evening while it was dark outside. 
Upon arrival, some officers went to the front of the house, and some officers went to the 
rear of the house. Thiemann secured a door on the side of the house. She heard footsteps imide 
the house, and then she entered the house. The door opened up into a stairwell with stairs going 
up and stairs going down. There was one room at the bottom of the stairs, and this room was 
below ground. The stairs going up led to the main floor. 
Thiemann went downstairs, and it took her approximately J1) s,econds to arrive at the 
bottom of the stairs. It was dark, but she used a flashlight. The stairs were covered with various 
items including clothing, stereos, wiring, tools, and other things. A computer tower was at the 
top of the steps. Thiemann had to step on things as she walked downstairs, and it was noisy. 
There were also items piled at the bottom of the stairs. She saw chainsaw parts and a case, and 




















the chainsaw was one of the items listed in the search warrant. As :;he walked down the si:airs, 
she yelled "search warrant." 
Thiemann entered the bedroom at the bottom of the stairs and made contact witl:. the 
Defendant. Upon making contact with the Defendant, she asked him 1:0 place his hands in the air. 
He complied, and then she asked him to place his hands behind his back. After she handcuffed 
him, she escorted him back upstairs and handed him off to a deputy. She told the deputy tha1 th,! 
Defendant had not yet been patted down or checked for weapons. She testified that she told the 
deputy to conduct a patdown of the Defendant. She did not actually see the deputy's face, but she 
saw his arm and observed that he was in police uniform. The landing had items in it on the fbor, 
so there was only enough room for one person to go through the door. 
Thiemann testified that the Defendant was not under arrest at 1his point, as they were jusi: 
securing everyone in the residence. She testified that she knew that they were going to arrest thE' 
Defendant; however, he was not under arrest at that point. She knew he was going to be arrei:ted 
because she stepped over the chainsaw that was described as stolen property in the search 
warrant. He was only being detained at that point. 
She then made contact with her supervisor and continued searching the residence. During 
the search, she found drug paraphernalia, a white powdery substan:;e, and a green leafy 
substance in an upstairs room. 
Thiemann transported the Defendant to jail and told him he was under arrest for 
possession of paraphernalia, possession of a white powdery substance, aid possession of stolen 
property. 



















2. Justin Bekker 
Justin Bekker testified at the motion to suppress hearing on February 27, 2014 regarding 
the events that occurred on November 2, 2013. Bekker is a reserve police officer with the 
Gooding County Police Department. Bekker assisted with the ~:earch of the Defendant', 
residence, and he testified that they found drug paraphernalia and stolen items. 
Bekker was the third person to enter the house. He entered through the front door. He saw 
two men, and he told them to lie down on the ground. He handcu:Ied the men and searched 
them. He conducted what he referred to as a Terry search which involved taking everything ou: 
of the pockets to be sure there was nothing that could hurt him. 
After the inside of the house was secured, Bekker went outside. Another officer askec. 
Bekker if he would pat down the Defendant or search him to make sure he did not have ID) 
weapons. Bekker was not present outside when Thiemann handed the Defendant over to another 
officer. Bekker testified that he was unsure if the Defendant had been detained or had been 
arrested, so he conducted what he referred to as a Terry search. Bekker interacted with the 
Defendant for approximately 15 to 20 minutes. Bekker felt the Defendant's belt and did not feel 
anything metal. Bekker searched the Defendant and found money in his left front pocket, and he 
found a clear bag with a white powdery substance inside it. 
IV. 
STANDARD 
The 4th Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and St:izures and was applled 
to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). "[A]ll evidence obtained by searches 
and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state 
court." Id. 
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Katz v. US protects the privacy of those that exhibit an actual expectation of privacy and 
that expectation is one that society is willing to accept as reasonable. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). An 
unlawful search and seizure can only occur where the defendant has 3. reasonable expectatio1 of 
privacy. Id at 360. Vehicles have a reduced expectation of privac:r. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 
U.S. 583, 590 (1974). "Warrantless searches are deemed to be 'per sc unreasonable' and the 
burden is upon the state to demonstrate that the search was carried out pursuant to one of the 
exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 21)9, 214, 677 P.2d 522 '.Ct 
App. 1984). 
"At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of \\itnesses, resolve fac·:uaJ 
conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in tht! trial court." Stat(: v. 
LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 907, 243 P.3d 1093 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Veldez-MoLna, 
127 Idaho 102,106,897 P.2d 993 (1995)). On appeal, "[t]he standard of review ofa suppression 
motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the court of 
appeals] accept[s] the trial court's findings of fact that are supporte:l 1:y substantial evider.ce, 
but ... freely review[s] the application of constitutional principles tc, the facts as found." Id. 
(citing State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559,561,926 P.2d 1284 (Ct. App. 1996)). 
v. 
ISSUE 
1. Should evidence obtained as a result of the search of the Defendant':; person be suppressed? 
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The Defendant argues that this Court should suppress all evidence seized from him and 
all of the fruits of the warrantless search and seizure of him. (M,)t. to Suppress & Mot. to 
Dismiss 1). 
The State argues that there are three justifications for the 1;earch of the Defendart. It 
argues that the search of the Defendant was valid as a search inciden-: to arrest. Second, the mate 
argues that the Defendant is incorrect in its argument that a person ccnniJt be searched during the 
execution of a search warrant, and the search warrant in this particular ,;ase included a search of 
the Defendant. Third, the Defendant would have been arrested for possessing the s·:okn 
chainsaw; therefore, under the doctrine of inevitable discovery, the drugs and paraphernalia 
would have been found on the Defendant's person. 
The Defendant argues that there cannot be a valid search inc:idmt to arrest because there 
were no grounds to arrest him in the first place. He asserts that nothing tied him to the Etol1~n 
items, so there was no valid reason for his arrest prior to the offict:r's search of his person and 
discovery of drugs and paraphernalia. He maintains that there were three other people in fae 
house, and there was nothing that tied him directly to the stolen items. He argues that since 
Officer Thiemann indicated that she knew they were going to arres : him, then the officers knew 
they were going to arrest him prior to their arrival at the residence. Therefore, they could have 
obtained an arrest warrant for the Defendant. Moreover, the doctrine of inevitable discovery dc,es 
not apply because the arrest was invalid. 
The evidence does not indicate that the officers knew that they were going to am,st 1he 
Defendant prior to the officers' entry into the evidence. The evidence is to the contrary. Offfoer 
7 - MEMORANDUM DEClSJON RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND MOTION TO DISMWS 




Thiemann testified that she knew that the Defendant was going to be arrested becaus~ she 
stepped over the chainsaw that was described as stolen property in the: search warrant. Ste dd 
not testify that she knew she was going to arrest the Defendant prior to entering the residence. 
Moreover, Officer Bekker testified that when he first made contact vvith the Defendant he did not 
know whether the Defendant had been arrested or whether the Defendant was merely being 
detained. This suggests that at least Officer Bekker did not believe that they were definitely 
going to arrest the Defendant prior to their entry into the residence. 
The search warrant specifically mentions the Defendant. Officer Thiemann, in her sworn 
affidavit, stated that Jeremy Larson informed her that he took the stolen chainsaw to the 
Defendant's house. Larson told Thiemann that the Defendant offerc!d -:o pay him $150.00 if he 
took the chainsaw to 529 California Street in Gooding, Idaho. The chainsaw was described in the 
warrant as a Stihl chainsaw that was orange and white in color with a1 orange case. The i:erial 
number was also included in the search warrant. 
The search warrant authorized a search of 529 California Street as well as a search of the 
Defendant's person for the items described in the warrant which included the chainsaw, 
Methamphetamine, Marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. 1 
The officers had probable cause to arrest the Defendant, and this probable cause 2rose 
once Thiemann saw the chainsaw as described in the search warrant. "To determine whethe:r an 
officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrei:t 
and then decide whether those historical facts amount to probable cause." State v. Gibson, 141 
Idaho 277, 282, 108 P.3d 424, 429 (Ct. App. 2005). If a person has ccmrnitted a public offern;e i1 
the presence of an officer, then a police officer can make a warrantlcss arrest of that person. Id. 
1 The Search Warrant authorized law enforcement to " .. . search the above described premises and persons for th,: 
property described above, .. . " 











Information that leads a person of ordinary care and prudence to belkve that a suspect is guilty is 
information that gives rise to probable cause. Id. A court will rev.eVv the facts known tc the 
officers at the time of the arrest, and the facts are viewed from an C1bjective viewpoint. Id. The 
state has the burden of proving that based upon the totality of the circumstances, a warrantlei:s 
arrest was valid. Id. at 283, 430. 
The officers had probable cause to arrest the Defendant. The Defendant does not argi.e 
that the search warrant is invalid. Based upon the search warrant, the officers had probable cam:e 
to arrest the Defendant after discovering the chainsaw. The search wanant indicated that Larsen 
told Thiemann that he stole a chainsaw and took it to the Defendant because the Defendant 
offered to pay Larson $150.00 for it. Larson told Thiemann that he took the chainsaw to 5~9 
California Street in Gooding. Based on this information and Thiernann's discovery o:: the 
chainsaw on the stairs, a person of ordinary care and prudence would believe that the Defenda1t 
was guilty of possessing the stolen chainsaw. 
"Searches incident to arrest are one of the well-established exceptions to the warra1t 
requirement." State v. LaMay, 140 Idaho 835, 838, 103 P.3d 448,451 (2004). Police are allowed 
to search an arrestee's person after an arrestee is lawfully arrested. Ia: 
So long as the search and arrest are substantially contemporaneous, 
and the fruits of the search are not required to estal::lish probable 
cause for the arrest, the search need not precisely foLow the arrest 
in Idaho to be incident to that arrest. Probable cause for arrest, of 
course, is a predicate for either a search or arrest. 
State v. Crabb, 107 Idaho 298, 304, 688 P.2d 1203, 1209 (Ct. App. 1984). 
"In Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the 
United States Supreme Court addressed this question in regard to the warrantless search of a 
person. The Court held that a suspect need not be formally arrested prior to a search of his or h~r 
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person as long as probable cause for the suspect's arrest existed at the time of the search. id. at 
111, 100 S.Ct. at 2564-65, 65 L.Ed.2d at 645-46. So long as the search and the arrest ar~ 
substantially contemporaneous, and the fruits of the search are not required to establish probable 
cause for the arrest, the search need not precisely follow the arrest ir. order to be incident to that 
arrest. State v. Johnson, 137 Idaho 656,662, 51 P.3d 1112, 1118 (Ct.App.2002)." State v. Smith, 
152 Idaho 115,119,266 P.3d 1220, 1224 (Ct. App. 2011). 
The search of the Defendant was a valid search incident to arrest. Although the searc:h of 
the Defendant's person occurred prior to his formal arrest, it occurred within a short peric,d of 
time of his arrest. Furthermore, the initial reason for his arrest wa:; h:ls possession of a stolen 
chainsaw and not because of anything found on his person. The searc:h of the Defendant's pc:rson 
and his arrest were substantially contemporaneous. The fruits of the i:earch of the Defendant. that 
is the white powdery substance, was not required to establish probable cause for the arrest. The 
probable cause for the arrest had been established prior to the disc,Jvery of the white powde1y 
substance and was based upon the possession of the stolen chainsaw. Therefore, the search prior 
to his arrest was valid. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Motion to Suppress and Moton to Dismiss are 
DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DA TED this // day of VUa [t-iL 2014. 
_::/=·===·::::::;··· ~2'...tl~J~-"--?-
r, istrict J 
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and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: DEFENDANT'S 
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Gooding Deputy Prosecutor 
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